We are less than five months into a conflict that will define threat calculus for years. The battlefield has already rewritten parts of the asymmetric playbook. Two tactical trends stand out and will shape the first year of the Gaza campaign: the rise of multi-domain low-cost effects by nonstate actors, and the corresponding demand on conventional forces to fight up, down, and through dense urban and subterranean terrain.

What Hamas showed on October 7 and in follow-on operations is not the work of a single tactic. It was coordinated denial of situational awareness at the tactical edge paired with massed, low-cost disruption. Commercial quadcopters and improvised loitering munitions were used to strain observation posts and disable automated turrets and sensors, creating local windows of opportunity for fighters to mass and penetrate defensive seams. That use of inexpensive UAS to blunt high-end surveillance and to deliver direct effects is well documented in open analysis of the attack and the early campaign.

Second, subterranean warfare returned as a center of gravity. The network beneath Gaza has been described by multiple military analysts as a vast, branching system a lot of fighting forces call a “metro.” Israeli forces uncovered large, vehicle-capable shafts and multi-kilometer complexes; the scale complicated both targeting and clearance and forced new tactical workarounds. This was not a minor adaptation by Hamas. The tunnels are integrated into the urban fabric and used for movement, logistics, command nodes, and allegedly as hostage concealment. Those features turn a cleared street into only a temporary gain if the enemy can reconstitute below ground.

The Israeli Defense Forces have responded by evolving tradecraft quickly. Counter-subterranean work now blends sensor fusion, painstaking ground mapping, and blunt engineering solutions. Reported tools range from ground-penetrating reconnaissance and camera-equipped UGVs to injecting barriers and, where commanders judged it necessary, controlled flooding to deny and collapse passages. Clearance is time consuming and casualty producing; it also forces difficult choices about effects versus civilian harm in dense neighborhoods. This combination of high-tech sensing and low-tech brute force has been the IDF’s pragmatic answer to a uniquely resilient underground network.

The proliferation of small drones and loitering munitions lowers the barrier for tactical surprise and attrition. Even when early use appears limited in physical damage, these systems impose operational friction. They demand attention, degrade tempo, and multiply the number of vectors defenders must harden. Analysts who track the diffusion of cheap UAS have warned that their psychological and operational effects persist even when interception rates are high. Expect adversaries to hold some capabilities in reserve to exploit moments when defenders are exposed.

Those battlefield evolutions have immediate implications for U.S. preparedness.

1) Munitions and logistics. The U.S. role as a global supplier strains stockpiles and industrial surge capacity. Washington moved existing inventories and fast-tracked deliveries to partners during the opening months of the Gaza campaign; reports from October through December 2023 show the U.S. diverted munitions and approved emergency sales to meet allied requirements. That same supply chain had been under pressure from the demands of the war in Ukraine. The combined demands highlight a simple truth: if the United States must support multiple partners and theaters at once, industrial base limits become an operational risk.

2) Counter-UAS at scale. The IDF and nonstate actors operating from Gaza illustrate how small UAS can shift battlespace calculations. For U.S. forces and homeland defenders the lesson is twofold. First, detection and attribution must be rapid and layered across sensors. Second, defense is not a single technical fix. Kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare, jamming and resilient passive measures should be tied to doctrine and training down to company and installation level. Expect greater Congressional attention and budget pressure to field mobile, short-range C-UAS and to adapt rules of engagement for domestic countermeasures.

3) Subterranean and urban skills. Gaza is a reminder that adversaries will leverage the verticality of modern cities. Clearing subterranean networks requires doctrine, equipment, and specialized units. The Army and Marine Corps need to accelerate realistic training in three-dimensional urban clearance, invest in robotic systems for subterranean mapping, and revise medical and logistics support concepts for protracted, casualty-heavy urban campaigns. Lessons from the region are not one-to-one transfers to other theaters, but the operational problem set is convergent: deny underground refuge, protect forces from UAS, and sustain tempo under attrition.

4) Legal, political, and force posture friction. Tactical gains that exact high civilian cost will produce political consequences for partners and for the U.S. That tension already shapes U.S. choices about munitions transfers and public posture. In short, operational needs will collide with strategic and legal constraints in democracies that must account for public opinion, international law, and partner relations. Expect those tensions to affect the speed and scale of future support decisions.

Recommendations for U.S. policymakers and security managers.

  • Rebuild surge capacity while buying down complexity. Fund production lines for key conventional munitions and prioritize short-lead items that sustain battlefield tempo. Surge capacity is deterrence.

  • Harden the edge. Field mobile counter-UAS systems to ground units and critical infrastructure, tie them into layered sensor networks, and push C-UAS tradecraft down to lowest tactical echelons. Training must be routine, not programmatic.

  • Invest in subterranean tools and teams. Robotics, sensing, and doctrine for underground operations require sustained investment. Train units on mapping, clearance, and casualty management in three-dimensional urban fights.

  • Plan for political constraints. War in dense population centers creates difficult choices. Build legal and interagency planning into contingency support to reduce strategic surprises when hard-edged assistance is requested.

Bottom line: the tactical evolution visible in Gaza is not exotic. It is the expected marriage of cheap autonomy and clever, ground-level tradecraft. For the United States the test is not a single capability. It is the ability to rebuild surge production, field layered defenses against UAS, and train for subterranean and urban clearance — all while navigating the political and legal constraints of coalition support. If the next 12 months look like the last four, homeland and expeditionary defenses must adapt now, not after the next tactical surprise.